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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mark Charles Wilson was convicted of the murder of Ms. Pat Brown.

Although

Mr. Wilson called the police shortly after the killing and admitted that he caused her death, he
maintains that the killing was not premeditated nor done with malice aforethought.
On appeal, he asserts that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the portions
of State's Exhibits 16 and 18 which contained evidence that he was a convicted felon.

He

contends that this evidence was not admissible under I.R.E. 609, as it was not impeachment
evidence, did not have relevance to the issue of credibility, and was unfairly prejudicial.
Additionally, he asserts that this evidence was also not admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) as it was
unfairly prejudicial.
Mr. Wilson also asserts the district court abused its discretion when it imposed an
excessive sentence and, later, denied his motion for leniency.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In March of 2018, Mr. Wilson shot and killed Ms. Pat Brown. Shortly after, he called
the police and admitted his actions. (State's Ex. 3.) On June 11, 2018, an Information was filed
charging Mr. Wilson with first degree murder and a firearm enhancement.

(R., pp.45-46.)

Despite his admission that he killed Ms. Brown, Mr. Wilson took his case to trial because he did
not believe that the killing qualified as a first-degree murder.
Prior to the start of trial, the parties litigated whether evidence regarding Mr. Wilson's
status as a convicted felon, as contained in portions of State's Exhibits 16 and 18, was admissible
under I.R.E. 609 or I.R.E. 404(b ).

(R., pp.211-12; Tr., p.97, L.23 - p.113, L.4.)

Notwithstanding a concession from both parties that this evidence was not admissible under
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I.R.E. 609 (R., p.211-12; Tr., p.101, Ls.18-23) and both parties' concern about the potential
prejudice from the jury learning Mr. Wilson was a felon (Tr., p.106, Ls.12-24, p.110, L.17 p.111, L.8), the district determined that the unredacted evidence was admissible (Tr., p.111, L.9
-p.113, L.4).
The State presented several witnesses including the neighbor Mr. Wilson borrowed the
gun from, Mr. Thompson (Tr., p.295, L.13 - p.308, L.9); the 911 operator, Ms. Lumpkin
(Tr., p.309, L.19 - p.319, L.25); officers involved in the investigation and arrest of Mr. Wilson,
Sheriff Lumpkin (Tr., p.321, L.5 - p.345, L.14), Chief Deputy Talbot (Tr., p.346, L.18 - p.360,
L.12, p.377, L.6 - p.383, L.17), and Sergeant Maydole (Tr., p.384, L.4 - p.417, L.21); medical
personnel who treated Mr. Brown before her ultimate death, Ms. Bricker (Tr., p.476, L.15 p.485, L.24) and Mr. Fife (Tr., p.486, L.10 - p.503, L.24); the coroner, Mr. Workman
(Tr., p.418, L.2 - p.476, L.10); and the forensic pathologist who examined Ms. Brown's body,
Dr. Warren (Tr., p.509, L.15 -p537, L.7).
The central question during trial was whether Mr. Wilson's killing of Ms. Brown was
premediated and done with malice aforethought. Although Mr. Wilson did not take the stand,
the reasons he borrowed the gun were testified to by Mr. Thompson, who noted Mr. Wilson told
him he wanted to borrow the gun to take care of some sick cats (Tr., p.304, Ls.3-21), and
explained in Mr. Wilson's police interview, to kill a sick cat or to kill himself (State Ex. 16,
13:08-15:50).
The jury found Mr. Wilson guilty as charged. (R., pp.276-77.)
Mr. Wilson was sentenced to a unified sentence of life, with thirty years fixed.
(R., pp.286-89.)

He filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.
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(R., pp.286, 294.) He also filed a timely motion for leniency under I.C.R. 35. (R., p.301; Supp.
Tr., p.4, Ls.19-20.) The motion was denied. (R., p.313.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting evidence that Mr. Wilson was a
convicted felon?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence on Mr.
Wilson and by denying his motion for a more lenient sentence?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Evidence That Mr. Wilson Was A
Convicted Felon

A.

Introduction
The district court allowed the State to present evidence that Mr. Wilson was a convicted

felon. This evidence, which came in through portions of State's Exhibits 16 and 18, showed the
post-arrest booking process and interrogation of Mr. Wilson though Officer Maydole's body
camera and the camera installed in the booking area. Mr. Wilson asserts that, contrary to the
district court's ruling, evidence he was a convicted felon was not admissible under Idaho Rules
of Evidence 609 or 404(b ). He also asserts that this evidence was unfairly prejudicial.

B.

Standard Of Review
Idaho appellate courts apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a lower

court's decision to either admit or exclude evidence. White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 888 (2004).
A district court acts within its discretion if it "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise ofreason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).

C.

Relevant Factual Information
Early in the case, the State filed a notice of intent to use I.R.E. 404(b) evidence related to

a prior conviction for battery with the intent to commit a serious felony. (R., pp.58, 99, 173-76.)
While this evidence was kept out of the trial, the parties also litigated whether related evidence-
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the fact that Mr. Wilson was a convicted felon-should still be admissible.

Specifically,

Mr. Wilson filed a Motion in Limine to prohibit the presentation of evidence of Mr. Wilson's
prior conviction under I.R.E. 609 and to prohibit the presentation of witness testimony related to
his status as a felon and audio and/or video exhibits in which it was noted that Mr. Wilson was a
convicted felon. (R., pp.211-12.)
At the hearing on the motion, Mr. Wilson's argument was broadened to encompass a
request to prohibit the State from introducing evidence both that he was a convicted felon and
that he was not allowed to possess a gun.

(Tr., p.97, L.23 - p.98, L.3.)

Specifically, he

requested that the video and audio exhibits be redacted, removing the conversation between
Mr. Wilson and Officer Maydole regarding his status as a convicted felon, and that all witnesses
be instructed to not discuss that Mr. Wilson is a convicted felon or that he was "not supposed to
have a gun." (Tr., p.98, Ls.1-24.)
The State agreed that the prior conviction was not admissible under I.R.E. 609, "whether
or not he's a convicted felon and bringing in that prior conviction, under the rules that's more
than ten years old, so we can't bring that in, just that he's a convicted felon, because that, I
believe - I agree with counsel; that would be inappropriate." (Tr., p.101, Ls.18-23.) However,
the prosecution argued that Mr. Wilson not being able to legally possess a gun was different and
that this information was necessary to prove that the killing was not an accident and was
premeditated. (Tr., p.101, L.23 - p.102, L.4.) The State asserted that Mr. Wilson's actions in
going and getting a gun, bringing it to the home, moving it around in the house, picking it up,
and shooting it at Ms. Brown proved his premeditation. (Tr., p.102, Ls.6-23.) The State also
argued that Mr. Wilson knowing he was not supposed to have a gun was significant in proving
the premeditated nature of these actions. (Tr., p.102, Ls.6-23.) The State noted that, "I won't
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mention that he's a prior felon. I won't mention the reason why, because I don't think that really
matters. Be he knows he is not supposed to have it." (Tr., p.103, Ls.5-8.)
In discussing redacting the audio, the State merely noted that, "frankly, I don't know how
to redact them." 1 (Tr, p.103, Ls.9-11.)
After some probing by the district court, the discussion turned back to I.R.E. 609. While
acknowledging that I.RE. 609 would only allow in conviction evidence for impeachment, the
prosecution again noted:
I do not intend on using the fact that he is felon. I do not want the jury to
convict him just because he is a felon. I want the jury to convict him because he
murdered Pat Brown. So I'm not intending on using that. I don't know if the rule
specifically prohibits that. I don't think it does. But I'm not impeaching him with
it.
But again, him being prohibited to have a firearm is not contemplated by
609 and, I think, specifically should be allowed, Your Honor ... because we do
intend on using that evidence.
(Tr., p.106, Ls.12-24.) The discussion continued and the district court noted:
THE COURT: ... As to the - and as to the body cam and jail cam footage,
counsel makes a good point, I guess, that they do have to prove - this is a firstdegree murder. They do have to prove premeditation. They've got to prove
malice aforethought. And your client's state of mind, of how he came into
possession of this firearm, knowing that he was not able to have a firearm, seems
to have some relevance to his willingness and his state of mind, to be willing to
go ahead and risk getting a firearm, putting it in his possession, and then what
ultimately happened. It seems to have some relevance, I guess. But I'll you
respond.
(Tr., p.110, Ls.4-16.)
Defense counsel then conceded that "it does have some relevance," but argued that the
prejudicial effect of the evidence was outweighed by the prejudicial impact:

1

The State's inability to redact the exhibits should play no role in the district court's
determination regarding admissibility. It is unclear from the record if the district court
considered this information in ruling on the motion in limine.
7

[I]f the jury hears this - we're trying to avoid the prior conviction evidence of,
okay, since you're already a criminal, you're probably a criminal this time too.
And those are the situations that we try to avoid with jurors because they tend to
believe that, that since you have a prior conviction, you're probably guilty this
time too .... I think the prejudice outweighs the relevance.
(Tr., p.110, L.17 -p.111, L.8.)
The district court then ruled that the audio and video recordings would be admissible:
Well, on that particular issue, I have given some thought. And I'm familiar with
Rule 403, 404(b ), as well as 609, as far as how it relates to proving character for
truthfulness, based upon prior convictions.
I think the state's argument is a compelling argument, that they're entitled
to present their theory of the case of why this was premeditated, and the malice
aforethought involved. And so I think that the defendant's state of mind and how
he - what he did in leading up to this incident, how he came in possession of a
firearm and the circumstances, and his state of mind, knowing that he was
ineligible to have a firearm but yet still willing to go to those - go to whatever
lengths to obtain possession of a firearm is relevant.
And to the issues in this case, I think that relevance outweighs any
prejudicial impact of just the fact that he had a prior felony conviction. There's
no reference to what the prior felony conviction was. . . . Well, the court, in
weighing - it is an issue of discretion, and I recognize that. I think that the
application of Rule 403 and 404(b), as well as considering 609 - although it's not
being used specifically as impeachment, it is reputation for truthfulness in this
context. The court considers that rule in this context as well. I do believe it's
very probative and very relevant to the state's elements of the case that they must
prove, as far as premeditation and malice and the defendant's state of mind. So I
am going to allow that tape recording, unredacted, even though it does make
reference to the fact that the defendant has a prior felony conviction.
(Tr., p.111, L.9 - p.113, L.4.)
Prior to the admission of State's Exhibits 14-19, Mr. Wilson renewed his prior objection.
(Tr., p.397, Ls.10-16.) The exhibits were admitted. (Tr., p.397, Ls.17-19.) Both State's Exhibit
16 and 18 contained information that Mr. Wilson was not allowed to possess a gun because he
was a convicted felon. (State's Ex.16, 11:42-11:52; State's Ex. 18, 16:09:24-16:09:39.)
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D.

Evidence That Mr. Wilson Was A Convicted Felon Was Improperly Admitted
Despite the acknowledgment of both parties that Mr. Wilson's status as a convicted felon

was inadmissible under I.R.E. 609 and that the use of the term "felon" was potentially
prejudicial, the district court allowed for the admission of unredacted copies of State's Exhibits
16 and 18. In so ruling, the district court blended together portions of I.R.E. 609 and I.R.E.
404(b) in erroneously surmising grounds for admission. Mr. Wilson asserts that the evidence
that he was a convicted felon was not admissible under I.R.E. 609, as it did not meet the basic
requirements of the rule, and that it was also inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b) because the
prejudicial effect of the evidence unfairly outweighed its limited probative value.

1.

The District Court Erred By Finding That The Evidence Was Admissible Under
I.R.E. 609

Idaho Rule of Evidence 609 states in pertinent part:
(a) In General. For the purpose of attacking a witness's character for truthfulness,
evidence of the fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony and the nature
of the felony must be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public
record, but only if the court determines in a hearing outside the presence of the
jury that the fact of the prior conviction or the nature of the prior conviction, or
both, are relevant to the witness's character for truthfulness and that the probative
value of this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the party offering the
witness. If the evidence of the fact of a prior felony conviction, but not the nature
of the conviction, is admitted for impeachment of a party to the action or
proceeding, the party has the option to present evidence of the nature of the
conviction, but evidence of the circumstances of the conviction is not admissible.
(b) Limit on Using the Evidence After 10 Years. This subdivision (b) applies if
more than 10 years have passed since the witness's conviction or release from
confinement for it, whichever is later. Evidence of the conviction is admissible
only if:
(1) its probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances,
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect; and
(2) the proponentives an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to
use it so that the party has a fair opportunity to contest its use.
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I.R.E. 609(a-b).
Under this rule, "the trial court must apply a two-prong test to determine whether
evidence of [a] prior conviction should be admitted: (1) the court must determine whether the
fact or nature of the conviction is relevant to the witness' credibility; and (2) if so, the court must
determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact." State v.
Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 630 (1999) (citation omitted). "In reviewing the trial court's decision
as to the first prong concerning relevance, the standard of review is de nova." Id. (citation
omitted). "In reviewing the trial court's decision as to the second prong concerning whether the
probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact, the standard of review is abuse
of discretion." Id. (citation omitted).
There are several reasons why the district court's decision was not proper under I.R.E.
609. First, I.R.E. 609 is designed for "impeachment by evidence of a criminal conviction," but
Mr. Wilson's status as a convicted felon was not admitted for impeachment purposes. Notably,
the State did not assert that the evidence was for impeachment purposes when it presented that
evidence. (Tr., p.101, L.18 -p.106, L.25.) In fact, the contested portions of State's Exhibits 16
and 18 were admitted during the State's case-in-chief

(Tr., p.397, Ls.17-19.)

Moreover,

Mr. Wilson never testified in the trial (see generally Tr.), which means that evidence was not
being used to "impeach" his testimony. For the same reason, that evidence was not probative on
"a witness's character for truthfulness." I.R.E. 609(a).
Second, as conceded by the State, the prior conviction was more than ten years old.
(Tr., p.101, Ls.18-23.) As such, the State was required to provide notice of intent to use the prior
conviction for I.R.E 609 purposes.
generally R.)

I.R.E. 609(b)(2).

No such notice was provided.

(See

Next, the information that Mr. Wilson was a convicted felon was not admissible as it was
not offered to show his "character for truthfulness," but instead to prove intent and other related
I.R.E. 404(b) purposes (Tr., p.101, L.18 - p.106, L.25). His prior conviction for battery with the
intent to commit a serious felony is not probative on the issue of credibility. In State v. Ybarra,
102 Idaho 573 (1981), the Court recognized that '"different felonies have different degrees of
probative value on the issue of credibility."' Id. at 580 (quoting People v. Rollo, 569 P.2d 771,
775 (Cal. 1977)). The Ybarra Court adopted the three categories of felonies the California
Supreme Court used in Rollo to determine whether a prior conviction can be used for
impeachment.

Id. at 580-81.

Category one includes crimes such as perjury which are

"intimately connected" with the issue of credibility. Id. at 580. Category two includes crimes
such as robbery or burglary which are "somewhat less relevant" to the issue of credibility. Id. at
580. Finally, category three includes crimes of violence, which "generally have little or no direct
bearing on honesty and veracity." Id. at 581 (quotation marks omitted). Mr. Wilson's prior
felony conviction was for a crime of violence.

Under this framework, the district court

incorrectly concluded that his prior conviction had relevance to the issue of credibility.
As such, the district court's decision to admit the unredacted versions of Exhibits 16 and
18 was not consistent with the legal standard set forth in I.R.E. 609 and the case law interpreting
that rule and was not based upon a proper exercise of reason.
This should be the end of I.R.E. 609 analysis in this case. However, for the sake of
argument, Mr. Wilson also asserts that the evidence should have been excluded because any
possible probative value, under I.R.E. 609, was outweighed by the prejudicial impact.

To

determine whether evidence of a prior conviction should be admitted, a trial court must
determine not only whether the evidence is relevant to credibility, but also whether the probative
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value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact. See Thompson, 132 Idaho at 630 (1999);

see also State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 30 (1997); State v. Grist, 152 Idaho 786, 789 (Ct. App.
2012). Mr. Wilson's argument regarding the prejudicial impact of this evidence can be found in
section I(D)(2)(b) below and is incorporated herein by reference.

2.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting The I.R.E. 404(b)
Evidence

The district court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence that Mr. Wilson was a
convicted felon under I.R.E. 404(b) because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standards and did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason because the limited probative
value of the evidence was outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect. Under I.R.E. 404(b ),
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to show a defendant's criminal
character or criminal propensity. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 (2010); I.R.E. 404(b). "It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident," if the prosecution has
provided notice that it intends to produce the evidence. Id.; I.R.E. 404(b). Yet, under I.R.E. 403,
relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice." State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 219 (2000).
In determining whether I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was properly admitted, the appellate court
employs a two-step analysis, determining:

(1) whether, under I.R.E. 404(b), the evidence is

relevant as a matter of law to an issue other than the defendant's character or criminal propensity;
and (2) whether, under I.R.E. 403, the district court abused its discretion in finding the probative
value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the
defendant.

Johnson, 148 Idaho at 667 (citing State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670 (1999)).
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However, "evidence of a person's actions or conduct, other than that set forth as an ultimate
issue for trial, is generally inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b )." State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114,
119 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 948, 950 (Ct. App. 1990).
Determinations of relevancy involve an issue of law and are reviewed de nova.

State v.

Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 501 (1999); State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 218 (Ct. App. 2009).

When reviewing the determination that the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by
unfair prejudice, the abuse of discretion standard is applied. State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816
(Ct. App. 1993).

a.

Relevancy

Evidence is only relevant, under I.R.E. 404(b ), if the jury can reasonably conclude that
the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009)
(citation omitted.). In order to make this determination, "the trial court must determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact." Id. (citations omitted.)
"The trial court must then determine whether the other crime or wrong is relevant to a material
and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity." Id. (citations omitted.)
"Evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) when its
probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant's
propensity to engage in such behavior." Grist, 147 Idaho at 52.
In the case at hand, Mr. Wilson is constrained to argue that the evidence has "some
relevance." (Tr., p.111, Ls.6-7.) While it is not entirely clear which of the I.R.E. 404(b) purpose
the evidence was concededly relevant to, Mr. Wilson maintains that the evidence must be
relevant to a purpose other than propensity. He asserts that the danger of the jury considering
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this evidence for this improper relevancy purpose is a significant factor in the balancing of the
evidence.
Additionally, for the purposes of weighing the evidence, he maintains that the evidence
had limited probative value.

b.

Weighing The Probative Value Against The Prejudicial Effect Of The
Evidence

Under I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence can be excluded by the district court if, inter alia, the
probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, danger of misleading the jury, or if the evidence would involve needless
presentation of cumulative evidence. State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249,254 (1995). To some extent
all probative evidence is prejudicial. State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 88 (Ct. App. 1989). The
question is whether that prejudice is unfair; whether it harms the defendant because it is so
inflammatory that it would lead the jury to convict regardless of other facts presented. Id.
While the district court's calculus of whether the probative value of evidence 1s
substantially outweighed by its prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, this discretion is
not without limits. As noted by the Court of Appeals in Stoddard:
This is not a discretion to depart from the principle that evidence of other crimes,
having no substantial relevancy except to ground the inference that [the] accused
is a bad man and hence probably committed the crime, must be excluded. The
leeway of discretion lies rather in the opposite direction, empowering the judge to
exclude other-crimes evidence, even when it has substantial independent
relevancy, if in his judgment its probative value for this purpose is outweighed by
the danger that it will stir such passion in the jury as to sweep them beyond a
rational consideration of guilt or innocence of the crime on trial. Discretion
implies not only leeway but responsibility. A decision clearly wrong on this
question of balancing probative value against danger of prejudice will be
corrected on appeal as an abuse of discretion.
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State v. Stoddard, 105 Idaho 533, 537 (Ct. App. 1983), (quoting McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF
THE

LAW ON EVIDENCE§ 190 (Cleary ed. 1972) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally,

as with all matters of discretion on the part of the district court, the court's determination of
whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its potential prejudice must
comport with applicable legal standards. See, e.g., Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 70 (2007)
(finding an abuse of discretion when the district court's action was not consistent with applicable
legal standards).
It is a fundamental tenet of the American legal system that a defendant may only be

convicted based upon proof that he committed the crime with which he is charged, and not based
upon poor character.

State v. Wood, 126 Idaho 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1994).

Evidence of

misconduct not charged in an underlying offense may have an unjust influence on the jurors and
may lead them to determine guilt based upon either: (1) a presumption that if the defendant did
it before, he must have done it this time; or (2) an opinion that it does not really matter whether
the defendant committed the charged crime because he deserves to be punished anyhow for other
bad acts. Id. at 244-45. "The prejudicial effect of [character evidence] is that it induces the jury
to believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime on trial because he is a man of
criminal character." Grist, 147 Idaho at 52 (quoting State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510 (1978)).
Therefore, I.R.E. 404(b) precludes the use of character evidence or other misconduct evidence to
imply that the defendant must have acted consistently with those past acts or traits. Id.
Even if relevant, the evidence should have been excluded under I.R.E. 403 because the
evidence was unfairly prejudicial. It is undoubtedly prejudicial to use the term "felon." The
term carries with it a certain stigma that can only serve to prejudice a defendant. State v. Roy,
127 Idaho 228, 231 (1995) (holding that the district court erred by using the terms "felony" and
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"feloniously" in the jury instructions on a driving under the influence case). Informing the jury
that a defendant is already a convicted felon invites the jury to convict based upon the misplaced
belief that, acting consistently with his prior behavior, the defendant also committed the instant
offense. Both parties acknowledged concerns about the effect this prejudicial information might
have on the jury. For example, the prosecution argued that, "I do not intend on using the fact
that he is felon. I do not want the jury to convict him just because he is a felon. I want the jury
to convict him because he murdered Pat Brown.

So I'm not intending on using that."

(Tr., p.106, Ls.12-16.) Defense counsel noted:
[I]f the jury hears this - we're trying to avoid the prior conviction evidence of,
okay, since you're already a criminal, you're probably a criminal this time too.
And those are the situations that we try to avoid with jurors because they tend to
believe that, that since you have a prior conviction, you're probably guilty this
time too .... I think the prejudice outweighs the relevance.
(Tr., p.110, L.17 - p.111, L.8.) Mr. Wilson admitted that he killed Ms. Brown, but maintained
that he did not do so premeditatedly. Leaming that Mr. Wilson was a convicted felon was likely
considered when the jury was determining whether he was guilty of first-degree murder or a
lesser form of homicide.
The probative value of the evidence was outweighed by this high danger of unfair
prejudice. In actuality, while the evidence had "some" probative value, that value is rather
limited. The fact that Mr. Wilson was a felon and was not allowed to possess a gun does not
make it any more likely that the killing of Ms. Brown was premeditated or completed with
malice aforethought. Certainly, the State would be able to present evidence that Mr. Wilson
went to a neighbor's home to borrow a gun shortly before the killing. However, his status as a
felon does not alter the inquiry as to whether he went to borrow the gun with the intent of putting
down a cat, killing himself, or killing Ms. Brown. It offers no illumination on the question of
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whether he decided to kill, or acted on an unconsidered and rash impulse. Likewise, it does not
assist the jury in determining whether the killing was based upon the heat of passion or sudden
quarrel, or was done with malice aforethought.

Instead, it begs the jury to analyze these

questions based upon his presumed propensity and to ask the irrelevant and pejorative question,
"Which form of homicide is a convicted felon more likely to commit?
In this case, the unfair prejudice was increased by the district court's lack of a proper
limiting instruction. The jury was not provided with an instruction clarifying that they could
only consider the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence for a limited purpose and not for propensity.
(R., pp.221-229, 241-260.)
In sum, the minimal probative value of the portions of State's Exhibits 16 and 18, which
contained a discussion of Mr. Wilson being a convicted felon, was outweighed by the risk of
unfair prejudice. This evidence likely impacted the jury's evaluation of which type of homicide
applied to the facts of this case. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion by failing to
exclude the evidence.

E.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove That Admittance Of The Evidence Was Harmless
Error
In this instance, because the error was objected to, the State has the burden of

demonstrating the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 221-22 (2010). To meet its burden, the State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error did not contribute to the verdict. See State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 11 (2013). "To say that
an error did not contribute to the verdict is . . . to find that error unimportant in relation to
everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record." Id.
(quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991)). "Thus, an appellate court's inquiry is not
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whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been
rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to
the error." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted, emphasis in original). The State cannot
show beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's in this case was harmless.
Mr. Wilson's status as a convicted felon had no impeachment value and very limited
relevance, but was highly prejudicial. It thus should have been excluded by the district court,
and it cannot be said that the guilty verdict rendered in this case was surely unattributable to the
error in the admission of this evidence.

As such, this Court should vacate Mr. Wilson's

conviction and remand this case to the district court for a new trial.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion Both In Sentencing Mr. Wilson And In
Denying His Motion For A More Lenient Sentence
A.

Introduction
Mr. Wilson was sentenced to a unified sentence of life, with thirty years fixed, for his

murder conviction, and an additionally five years indeterminate for the deadly weapon
enhancement. In imposing sentence, the district court did not sufficiently consider the mitigating
factors and, as result, abused its sentencing discretion.
Moreover, in ruling on the motion for a reduction of sentence, the district court did not
properly understand the scope of its discretion, as demonstrated by its statement that it could
ignore the new information Mr. Wilson presented in support of his motion and in expressing
concern about altering a separate sentence that was to be served consecutively. Additionally, the
district court did not sufficiently consider all the mitigating factors, and in doing so, improperly
refused to reduce a sentence which failed to address one of the goals of sentencing.
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B.

Standards Of Review
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh

sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the
public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982). Accordingly, in order
to show an abuse of discretion in the district court's sentencing decision, he must show that, in
light of the governing criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts.
State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997); The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives,
are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.

State v.

Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).
The protection of society is the pnmary objective the court should consider.

Id.

Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that rehabilitation is usually the first means
the district court should consider to achieve that goal. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240
(1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015); accord
State v. Bickhart, 164 Idaho 204, 206 (Ct. App. 2018) (noting the preference identified in McCoy
does not preclude a sentence of incarceration, if that is ultimately the best method to achieve the
goals of sentencing). In other words, while the district court may place significant weight on any
one of the goals of sentencing, that does not mean it can ignore mitigating factors speaking to
one of the other goals as being insignificant or unimportant. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho
318, 320 (2006) (noting that the failure to sufficiently consider various mitigating factors has
resulted in abuses of sentencing discretion in several cases). A failure to do so should result in a
more lenient sentence. See, e.g., State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); Cook v. State, 145

19

Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Carrasco,

117 Idaho 295, 301 (1990).
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35 is addressed to
the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency which may be
granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe in light of new or additional
information presented to the sentencing court. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). A
district court abuses its discretion when it fails to perceive the issue as one of discretion, fails to
act within the outer boundaries of that discretion, it fails to act consistently with applicable legal
standards, or fails to reach its decision by an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163
Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018).
"The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those
applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable," which were set forth
supra. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). Therefore, in reviewing the district

court's decision to deny Mr. Wilson's motion for leniency, the district court needed to
sufficiently consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating factors as
they were altered by the new evidence Mr. Wilson presented in support of his motion. See id.;
accord Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203.

C.

Relevant Factual Information
The presentence investigation (PSI) noted that this was Mr. Wilson's first maJor

encounter with the law since his 2005 conviction.

(Con£ Docs., p.32 (noting only one

misdemeanor DUI conviction in the intervening thirteen years).) The PSI author noted that,
while Mr. Wilson reported struggling during his misdemeanor probation, the Department of
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Correction's records indicated he "did very well on supervision with few exceptions," and
specifically noted he had been "granted early discharge from parole [on the 2005 case] for good
behavior." (Con£ Docs., p.32.)
The PSI also noted Mr. Wilson had received treatment in 2005for a "panic/anxiety
disorder" in the form of psychotropic medication. (Con£ Docs., pp.37; accord Conf. Docs.,
p.110.) In addition, it indicated he had attended a residential treatment program for alcohol
abuse in Maryland in 2004. (Conf. Docs., p.38.) However, Mr. Wilson admitted that, when he
"got away" from that support network, he relapsed. (Conf. Docs., p.38.) However, a subsequent
psychological evaluation noted that Mr. Wilson "does not appear [to] have participated in anger
management treatment." (Conf. Docs., p.124.)
The new psychological evaluation diagnosed Mr. Wilson with "Alcohol Dependence;
Intermittent Explosive Disorder; Generalized Anxiety Disorder; and Personality Disorder Not
Otherwise Specified with Borderline and Schizoid features."

(Conf. Docs., p.123.)

The

psychologist concluded Mr. Wilson "is in need of community-based relapse prevention treatment
programs" to deal with his alcohol dependence. (Con£ Docs., p.123.) She also recommended
the not-yet-received anger management treatment to deal with his intermittent explosive
disorder.

(Conf. Docs., p.124.) Finally, she recommended a reassessment of Mr. Wilson's

medication regimen, as he reported his current medication had ceased being effective, and she
also recommended further evaluations to determine if there were any under lying neurological
conditions. (Conf. Docs., pp.123-24.)
Based on the fact that the psychological evaluation showed the possibility that Mr.
Wilson could be successfully rehabilitated with proper treatment measures, as well as the fact
that he immediately took responsibility, and expressed remorse, for his actions in this case,
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defense counsel recommended the district court impose "the minimum" of ten years fixed.
(Tr., p.681, Ls.9-12; accord Tr., p.682, L.12 - p.683, L.9 (Mr. Wilson's allocution, where he
continued to accept responsibility and apologize for his actions).)
The district court rejected that recommendation. Rather, it put significant of weight on
the similarities between this case and his 2005 conviction. (Tr., p.687, L.11 - p.688, L.9.) It also
concluded that the fact Mr. Wilson committed this sort of similar offense despite having received
treatment as a result of the 2005 conviction meant that rehabilitation was "far down th[ e] list" of
considerations in its sentencing decision. (Tr., p.690, L.16 - p.691, L.6; Tr., p.695, L.23 - p.696,
L.2.) Instead, focusing on the goals of deterrence and punishment, the district court imposed a
unified term of life plus five years, with thirty years fixed.

(R., pp.286-89; See Tr., p.694,

L.9 - p.695, L.4.)
Mr. Wilson filed a timely motion for leniency under I.C.R. 35. (R., p.301; Supp. Tr., p.4,
Ls.19-20.) At the hearing on Mr. Wilson's motion for leniency, defense counsel presented
several exhibits in support of his motion which "weren't available to me at the sentencing
hearing." (Supp. Tr., p.4, Ls.19-20.) For example, partially to address indications during the
trial and at the initial sentencing hearing that Mr. Wilson had essentially been "mooching off'
Ms. Brown, he presented a bill for services Mr. Wilson had performed around Ms. Brown's
house. (Supp. Tr., p.9, Ls.7-11; see Exhibits, p.53.) He also presented several holiday cards that
Ms. Brown had given Mr. Wilson in order to show the nature of the relationship which had
existed between the two. (Supp. Tr., p.6, Ls.16-22; see Exhibits, pp.47-52.)
Based on that new information, defense counsel argued for the district court to reduce the
fixed term of Mr. Wilson's sentence to ten years, though he acknowledged an indeterminate term
oflife was appropriate. (See Supp. Tr., p.10, Ls.6-9.) Defense counsel argued this reduction was
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particularly appropriate in this case because Mr. Wilson was already

2

which

meant the thirty-year fixed sentence originally imposed was effectively a fixed-life sentence, and
as such, only a reduced sentence would provide a meaningful opportunity for rehabilitation.
(Supp. Tr., p.8, L.22 - p.9, L. 1.)
The district court admitted Mr. Wilson's new information over the prosecutor's
objections. (See Supp. Tr., p.6, L.3 - p.7, L.11.) However, it declared, "it's not required to
consider the Exhibits A through D that were submitted" in support of the motion.

(Supp.

Tr., p.16, Ls.1-3.) The district court proceeded to reiterate its reasons for imposing the original
sentence and denied Mr. Wilson's motion based on that. (See generally Supp. Tr., p.16, L.20 p.20, L.24.) The district court did mention that it might be inclined to reduce Mr. Wilson's fixed
term by five years, but concluded that such a reduction would not fully address Mr. Wilson's
concerns about an opportunity to rehabilitate. (Supp. Tr., p.20, Ls.17-21.) It also expressed a
concern that, by reducing Mr. Wilson's sentence in this case, it would nullify the sentence
imposed by the judge in Mr. Wilson's other case. (Supp. Tr., p.19, L.24 - p.20, L.4.) For both
those reasons, it decided to not reduce Mr. Wilson's sentence in this case. (Supp. Tr., p.20,
Ls.17-21.)
In reaching its decision to deny Mr. Wilson's motion for leniency entirely, the district
court did briefly mention the holiday cards Mr. Wilson had submitted in support of his motion.
(Supp. Tr., p.18, Ls.14-16.) However, it did not reference the bill for services or Mr. Wilson's
work history. (See generally Supp. Tr.) In the resulting order, it stated the motion was denied

2

During the hearing on the motion for leniency, defense counsel stated Mr. Wilson was
(Supp. Tr., p.8, Ls.22-23.) The PSI indicated Mr. Wilson was
(Con£ Docs., p.27.) That difference does not have a material effect on the arguments in this
case.
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because "The Defendant provided no new information convincing the Court that the sentence
should be reduced" and the initially-imposed sentence was appropriate. (R., p.313.)

D.

A Sufficient Consideration Of The Mitigating Factors Demonstrates The Initially
Imposed Sentence Fails To Serve The Goal Of Rehabilitation, And Therefore, Represents
An Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion
As the Idaho Supreme Court has made clear, the first means which the district court

should consider, to achieve the primary goal of protection of society, is rehabilitation.

See

McCoy, 94 Idaho at 240. Certainly, the district court could put significant weight on the other
goals of deterrence and punishment, but that does not mean it can disregard rehabilitation
entirely in so doing, or relegate the importance of rehabilitation as the first and best means to
promote the primary goal of protection of society. See Knighton, 143 Idaho at 320.
And yet, that is exactly what the district court did in Mr. Wilson's case. (See, e.g., Supp.
Tr., p.20, Ls.17-21.) For example, it focused on the fact that because Mr. Wilson had received
some level of treatment as a result of his 2005 conviction, the fact that he had a similar episode
this time meant a longer fixed sentence was appropriate.

(Tr., p.690, L.16 - p.691, L.6;

Tr., p.695, L.23 - p.696, L.2.) That is a gross misrepresentation of what the sentencing materials
actually show-that Mr. Wilson previously received insufficient mental health treatment and
additional mental health and alcoho 1 abuse treatment was necessary and could assist in
rehabilitation.
First, the psychologist specifically noted Mr. Wilson "does not appear [to] have
participated in anger management treatment." (Con£ Docs., p.124 (emphasis added).) Thus,
whatever treatment he may have had back in 2005 did not include treatment for his primary,
underlying mental health condition of intermittent explosive disorder. (See Con£ Docs., p.124
(recommending anger management treatment to address the intermittent explosive disorder
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diagnosis).) As such, Mr. Wilson's prior treatment cannot be considered all-inclusive, as the
district court appears to have done.
Specifically, the mental health treatment Mr. Wilson received in 2005 was based on the
much more generalized diagnosis of a "panic/anxiety disorder." (See Con£ Docs. pp.37, 110.)
Thus, the more detailed diagnoses of intermittent explosive disorder, generalized anxiety
disorder, and a personality disorder, provides more insight into Mr. Wilson's mental condition,
and thus, a better idea of how to be able to effectively treat it. This conclusion is reinforced by
the fact that the prior treatment (anxiety medication) had apparently become ineffective over the
course of thirteen years. (See Conf. Docs., p.124.) In fact, the psychological evaluation even
recommended further evaluation to make sure there was not some sort of underlying
neurological condition which would also need to be accounted for in building a more effective
treatment regimen. (See Conf. Docs., p.123.)
Furthermore, the psychologist noted that Mr. Wilson would need "community-based
relapse prevention treatment programs" to address his alcohol dependence, the precise
programing he lost touch with over the years following his alcohol treatment program in
Maryland. (Conf. Docs., pp.116, 123.) Therefore, the district court's focus on the fact that
Mr. Wilson had some relevant treatment over thirteen years ago without also acknowledging the
changes in Mr. Wilson's condition over the intervening thirteen years does not represent a

sufficient consideration of Mr. Wilson's current mental health needs, and thus, of his current
potential for rehabilitation. See Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999) (making it clear that
the district court needs to consider the entirety of the defendant's mental health issues when
making sentencing decisions); accord I.C. § 19-2523.
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Without that sort of sufficient

consideration of these mitigating factors, the district court abused its discretion. Cf Knighton,
143 Idaho at 320.
Moreover, the entire premise of the district court's analysis in that regard is flawed-the
fact that a person experiences a relapse during the course of their rehabilitative efforts does not
demonstrate a total inability to rehabilitate. See, e.g., United States v. Hawkins, 380 F.Supp.2d
143, 144 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining that "[t]he fact that the defendant engaged in further
criminal activity while she was in the process of rehabilitation does not preclude a finding of
extraordinary rehabilitation" or that imposition of a more lenient sentence in recognition of that
fact is improper). In terms ofhis alcohol use specifically, as indicated by Mr. Wilson, his relapse
with alcohol occurred when he lost touch with the support network created in his treatment
program in Maryland. (Con£ Docs., p.38.) Thus, providing him with new resources in Idaho,
and help to reengage those rehabilitative efforts, was needed.

(See Conf. Docs., pp.123-24

(specifically recommending such rehabilitative opportunities and noting the alcohol treatment
should be in a community setting).) In other words, a sufficient consideration of all these facts
not only demonstrates that rehabilitation is possible, but that, if successful, it would provide
more protection to society in the long term. See McCoy, 94 Idaho at 240.
That Mr. Wilson can be successful in such efforts with the proper support is actually
apparent from a sufficient consideration of the record.

For example, the Department of

Correction reported, "Mr. Wilson did very well on supervision [while on parole for the 2005
incident and on probation for an intervening misdemeanor DUI] with few exceptions. He was
granted early discharge from parole for good behavior." (Conf. Docs., p.32.) Thus, the fact that
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he managed to avoid significant issues and relapses for nearly thirteen years 3 further
demonstrates continued rehabilitation is possible, particularly with the better understanding of
his underlying mental health issues. As such, a more lenient sentence, on which allows for a
meaningful opportunity to engage in those rehabilitative efforts, was appropriate in this case.
Further, both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have recognized
that the timing of rehabilitative programming is an important consideration at sentencing. See,
e.g., State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125, 126 (1980); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90

(Ct. App. 2008). To delay such rehabilitation for a period of thirty years, when dealing with it in
the first ten would better promote all the goals of sentencing, further reveals the district court's
sentencing decision to be unreasonable. After all, sentences are to be crafted so that they do not
force the prison system to continue detaining a person once rehabilitation or age has decreased
the risk of recidivism. State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988). For example, in
Dunnagan, the Supreme Court noted, sufficiently considering all the mitigating factors

demonstrated that the defendants "should be able to benefit, if at all, from what rehabilitative
programs are available, within a fourteen year period," and reduced their sentences to that term.
Dunnagan, 101 Idaho at 126. The same is true in Mr. Wilson's case. There was a reduced need

to force the prison system to detain him for thirty years when timely access to the needed
treatment could be provided in the first ten years and he was already advancing in age, both of
which would reduce the risk ofrecidivism. See id.; compare Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489
(Ct. App. 2008).

3

Mr. Wilson was only incarcerated on his 2005 sentence for thirteen months before being
paroled. (Con£ Docs., p.32.) His jail sentence for the misdemeanor DUI was suspended. (Con£
Docs., p.32.) As such, the record indicates he was not incarcerated for most of the intervening
thirteen-year period.
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In fact, Mr. Wilson's case is very similar to Cook in this regard. In Cook, the Court of
Appeals vacated a sentence with twenty-nine years fixed which had been imposed on a
Cook, 145 Idaho at 486. The Court explained that fixed term was excessive,

in part, because "to incarcerate Cook for, at a minimum, the full determinate twenty-nine years
would be nearly the equivalent of imposing a life sentence given the relatively advanced age
Cook will have reached in a prison setting by the time he is even eligible for parole." Id. at 489.
Basically, the Court concluded, such a sentence "essentially discounts any possibility of
rehabilitation and successful reentry into society," which was precisely the consideration the
Eubank Court had previously warned sentencing courts to keep in mind. Id. (citing Eubank, 114

Idaho at 635, 639). This consideration is just as applicable in Mr. Wilson's case, as he was some
nine years older than Mr. Cook (Con£ Docs., p.27), and his fixed term was a year longer than
Mr. Cook's.
The other mitigating factors, when sufficiently considered, reinforce the conclusion that a
more lenient fixed term would better serve all the goals of sentencing. The fact that Mr. Wilson
immediately took responsibility for his actions by calling the police is important because
acknowledgment of guilt and acceptance of responsibility by the defendant demonstrate that he
has taken the critical first steps toward rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815
(Ct. App. 2010). Likewise, the Idaho Supreme Court, while making it clear that it does not
constitute a defense to the crime, has still specifically acknowledged that the ingestion of alcohol
should be considered as a mitigating factor at sentencing. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414
n.5 (1981). In other words, reinvigorating the treatment of Mr. Wilson's alcoholism, a major
factor behind his actions in this case, would also promote rehabilitation, and thus, would better
promote the overall protection of society.
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Notably, a shorter fixed term would not reduce the risk to society if Mr. Wilson were
unable to satisfactorily rehabilitate during that time. The parole board has broad discretion over
whether or not to parole an inmate.

See, e.g., State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931 (2005).

Therefore, even if Mr. Wilson were eligible for parole in ten years, as defense counsel
recommended, the Board could still decide not to grant him parole at that time, and that would
cause Mr. Wilson to serve some or all of his remaining sentence in prison, which, as defense
counsel acknowledged, could reasonably be up to the remainder of his life. Again, the point is
that the sentence should be crafted so that it does not force the prison system to continue
detaining a person after rehabilitation and age have reduced the risk to society. Giving the parole
board the opportunity to make that assessment earlier does not detract from the other goals of
sentencing, as the district court apparently believed. (See generally Tr., p.694, L.9 - p.695, L.4.)
All the reduced fixed term does is give meaningful consideration the goal of rehabilitation while
still imposing a substantial overall sentence to address the other goals of sentencing.
Since the district court failed to sufficiently consider the mitigating factors which speak
to the goal of sentencing, which is supposed to be the first method considered for achieving the
primary goal of protecting society, the district court abused its discretion in the same manner
which the Knighton Court pointed out would justify vacating the sentence as excessive in several
other cases. The same result should occur here.

E.

The District Court's Statements In Denying The Motion For Leniency Demonstrate It
Did Not Properly Understand The Legal Standards Governing Its Decision
In ruling on Mr. Wilson's motion for leniency, the district court declared "it's not

required to consider the Exhibits A through D that were submitted" in support of the motion.
(Supp. Tr., p.16, Ls.1-3.) That position was reiterated in the written order denying the motion
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for leniency, which said the motion was denied in part because "[t]he Defendant provided no
new information convincing the Court that the sentence should be reduced."4 (R., p.313.) The
court's ruling is problematic because it demonstrates the district court did not properly
understand the scope of its discretion in this regard.
The district court may not, in fact, ignore facts or evidence presented which speak to one
of the goals of sentencing when making its sentencing decisions. E.g. Knighton, 143 Idaho at
320 (noting that, in several cases, the sentence has been reduced as excessive because the district
court failed to give sufficient consideration to relevant mitigating facts). Since the standard for
reviewing decisions on motions for leniency is the same as with the initial sentencing decision,
Trent, at 125 Idaho at 253, Knighton's admonition about the need to consider all the relevant

facts in imposing the sentence is equally applicable in the context of a motion for leniency.
Thus, while the district court may focus on one of the goals of sentencing, it may not ignore
mitigating factors speaking to the other goals of sentencing.
As such, the district court's own words demonstrate it made its decision on Mr. Wilson's
motion for leniency without considering Exhibits A though D and without a proper
understanding of the legal standards applicable to that decision. Therefore, the resulting decision
cannot be said to be a proper exercise of discretion. Compare State v. Van Kamen, 160 Idaho
534, 540 (2016) (noting that, while the district court could have reached the same sentencing

4

To the extent this statement indicates the district court concluded that Mr. Wilson had failed to
provide sufficient information to support his motion, as required by Huffman, such a decision
would be clearly erroneous. Defense counsel made it clear the four exhibits were not available
for presentation at the time of the initial sentencing hearing. (Supp. Tr., p.4, Ls.19-20.) As such,
they were both new and additional information which, as defense counsel explained,
demonstrated why a more lenient sentence was appropriate in this case. (See, e.g., Supp. Tr., p.6,
Ls.16-22, p.9, Ls.7-11.) Thus, to the extent the district court denied Mr. Wilson's motion for
failing to comply with Huffman, such a clearly erroneous determination would be its own basis
for vacating the order denying the motion for leniency.
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decision in a proper manner, its actual words demonstrated it had, in reality, considered an
improper factor, and so, its resulting decision was actually tainted and, thus, had to be vacated).
This conclusion remains true even though the district court briefly referenced the holiday cards
in its explanation of the sentence.

(See Supp. Tr., p.18, Ls.14-16.)

That is because the

fundamental basis of its decision remains erroneous. Compare State v. Villavicencio, 159 Idaho
430, 437 (Ct. App. 2015) (holding that, because the district court did not recognize the scope of
its discretion, the case had to be remanded for reconsideration by the district court with a proper
understanding of the legal principles at issue).

Regardless, the court did not reference the

evidence regarding Mr. Wilson's employability (Exhibit A), and that failure, by itself, still
demonstrates the ultimate decision was an abuse of discretion. See Knighton, 143 Idaho at 320.
Additionally, the district court noted that Mr. Wilson had received a consecutive sentence
in another related case. (Supp. Tr., p.19, Ls.17-23.) The district court expressed concern that it
would be "nullifying what the judge in that case felt was appropriate on your conviction in that
case. And I'm not - at this point not willing to do that." (Supp. Tr., p.19, L.24 - p.20, L.4.) This
concern again illustrates a significant misunderstanding of the district court's discretion and
resulted in an arbitrary reduction in authority.
Certainly, the sentencing court in Mr. Wilson's related case could not have determined
that only a fixed sentence of thirty-three years was appropriate for the combined cases, as that
court did not have jurisdiction over the murder case and could only sentence Mr. Wilson to a
unified sentence of up to five years for the unlawful possession of a firearm charge. LC. § 183316; State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 230 (Ct. App. 1999) (vacating a sentencing decision
when it was based on trying to address facts from a case which was pending sentencing before a
different judge). Instead, the sentencing court in the other case made a limited determination that
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Mr. Wilson should serve three years fixed separate and apart from whatever sentence the district
court imposed for the murder conviction.
Thus, it was solely the discretion of Judge Thompson, both at the time of sentencing and
at the time of ruling on the motion for leniency, to determine the appropriate sentence in the
murder case should be.

He could, therefore, reduce Mr. Wilson's sentence on the murder

conviction without nullifying the sentence imposed in Mr. Wilson's other case. His failure to
recognize this authority (or worse, his decision to effectively yield his authority to another
district court judge) also represents an abuse of discretion.
Thus, remand is necessary in light of these two errors.

As the Court of Appeals

succinctly articulated the relevant rule: "When a judge exercises his discretion by reference to
an erroneous legal standard, . . . the proper appellate response is to remand the case for
reconsideration." Associates Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605 (Ct. App. 1987). The
Idaho Supreme Court has, more recently, reaffirmed that point: "When the discretion exercised
by a trial court is affected by an error of law, the role of the appellate court is to note the error
made and remand the case for appropriate findings." Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1,
6-7 (2009). Therefore, this case needs to be remanded for a new decision made with a proper
understanding of the legal standards, through which a full and proper evaluation of the issues
raised by the motion for leniency can be sufficiently conducted.

F.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Reducing Mr. Wilson's Sentence
Pursuant To His Motion For Leniency
Considering the merits of the district court's decision to deny Mr. Wilson's motion for

leniency also reveals that, much as it did when it initially imposed Mr. Wilson's sentence, the
district court abused its discretion by not sufficiently considering the goal of rehabilitation or the
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mitigating factors speaking to that sentencing objective. In fact, the district court's irrationality
in that regard is demonstrated by the fact that it considered the motion for leniency to be an "all
or nothing" proposition. Specifically, it said it was willing to consider a five-year reduction to
the fixed term of the sentence, but because such a reduction would not give Mr. Wilson the full
benefit he was seeking, it would not even reduce his sentence in that manner. (Supp. Tr., p.20,
Ls.17-21.) However, the rationales justifying any reduction of the sentence would still better
serve the all the goals of sentencing (and particularly, the heretofore-ignored goal of
rehabilitation), even if it were not the best option available. After all, a sentence with a fixed
term of twenty-five years instead of thirty years would at least not force the prison system to
continue detaining Mr. Wilson for those five years, if rehabilitation and age had sufficiently
reduced the risk for recidivism by that point. See Cook, 145 Idaho at 486; Eubank, 114 Idaho at
635, 639.
Essentially, the district court was acknowledging the initially-imposed sentence was
excessive, and that a more sufficient consideration of all the relevant factors actually revealed a
more lenient sentence would better serve all the goals of sentencing.

Compare State v.

Anderson, 152 Idaho 21, 23 (Ct. App. 2011) (vacating a sentencing decision because the district

court's statements in denying a motion for leniency demonstrated the district court did not
understand the full scope of its discretion). As such, even though it might not have been the best
available sentence in terms of rehabilitation, the district court still abused its discretion by not
reducing the sentence for the five years it indicated was appropriate in this case.
The new information Mr. Wilson presented in support of his motion for leniency
reinforces the conclusion that Mr. Wilson's sentence was excessive and should have been
reduced. In fact, when viewed alongside the other factors speaking to Mr. Wilson's potential for
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rehabilitation discussed in Section II(D ), supra, the new information-particularly the bill for
services rendered-demonstrates that Mr. Wilson could be a contributing member of society if
he received the proper treatment, and as such, that reducing the fixed term to ten years would
better serve all the goals of sentencing. As such, the district court abused its discretion by
denying Mr. Wilson's motion for leniency.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Wilson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand his
case for a new trial. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.

Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his motion for leniency be

vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 11 th day of September, 2020.
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